An MOU that has in-built tensions in the Strait of Hormuz — Phar Kim Beng

JUNE 27 — The recently concluded memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran has undoubtedly reduced the immediate risk of a wider regional war.

Shipping has resumed through the Strait of Hormuz. Energy markets have calmed from their wartime highs. Regional governments have welcomed the reduction in hostilities after months of uncertainty and confrontation.

Yet diplomacy should not be confused with resolution.

The agreement may have postponed conflict, but it has not removed the strategic disagreements that produced the crisis in the first place.

Indeed, the memorandum appears to contain several built-in tensions that may return with greater intensity once the initial sixty-day arrangements expire.

From the perspective of the Arab Gulf states, the agreement repeats one of the major weaknesses of the 2015 nuclear agreement by focusing narrowly on immediate military de-escalation while leaving broader regional security concerns largely untouched.

The central concern of the Gulf monarchies has never been limited to uranium enrichment.

Their concerns are wider and more immediate.

They involve ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, proxy forces and maritime security.

These issues remain unresolved.

During the recent conflict, Iran demonstrated the scale and sophistication of its missile and drone capabilities.

Thousands of projectiles crossed regional airspace, forcing Gulf countries to activate costly missile defence systems and exposing vulnerabilities in strategic infrastructure.

Energy facilities, ports, airports and shipping routes all became potential targets.

Yet the memorandum contains no meaningful restrictions on Iranian missile or drone programmes.

This omission is striking.

At the beginning of the conflict, the destruction of Iran’s missile industry was repeatedly described as one of Washington’s principal objectives.

More recently, however, American rhetoric has shifted considerably.

The argument now being advanced is that Iran cannot reasonably be denied missile capabilities if other regional states possess similar systems.

Such a reversal reflects a larger geopolitical reality.

The United States no longer possesses the same leverage over Tehran that it enjoyed a decade ago.

Military pressure failed to compel surrender.

Economic sanctions failed to induce regime collapse.

International support for prolonged escalation proved limited.

Negotiations therefore evolved from attempts at coercion to efforts at accommodation.

The second major source of tension concerns Iran’s extensive network of non-state armed groups across the region.

The memorandum remains largely silent regarding organisations operating in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen despite their growing significance in regional security calculations.

For the Arab Gulf states, these organisations represent not merely ideological partners of Tehran but extensions of Iranian strategic depth.

Recent events have demonstrated that militia groups operating beyond Iranian territory possess the ability to influence developments across the Gulf without necessarily exposing Iran itself to direct retaliation.

This creates an inherently unstable deterrence environment.

The agreement appears to freeze rather than resolve these issues.

Indeed, by incorporating these groups into the broader ceasefire arrangements, the memorandum may inadvertently provide them with a degree of political protection while leaving their military capabilities largely intact.

The regional architecture of armed non-state actors has become one of the defining features of contemporary Middle Eastern geopolitics.

No agreement that ignores this reality can reasonably claim to establish a durable peace.

Perhaps the most significant ambiguity concerns the future governance of the Strait of Hormuz itself.

The memorandum merely specifies that commercial shipping will continue to enjoy free passage without charges for sixty days.

Beyond that period, uncertainty begins.

Such ambiguity is dangerous.

Approximately one fifth of global oil trade passes through the strait.

For Asia, the importance is even greater.

Japan, South Korea, China, India and many South-east Asian economies remain heavily dependent on uninterrupted energy flows through Hormuz.

Malaysia itself cannot afford to ignore developments there despite being an energy producer in its own right.

Energy markets react quickly to uncertainty.

Shipping companies react even faster.

Insurance premiums increase almost immediately when legal and political questions emerge over freedom of navigation.

The possibility that transit fees or administrative charges may be introduced after the sixty-day period creates precisely the kind of uncertainty that global commerce seeks to avoid.

Statements emerging from Tehran suggest that Iran increasingly views itself not merely as one stakeholder among many but as the principal administrator of the strait.

This position is unlikely to be accepted by the Arab Gulf states.

For Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, freedom of navigation cannot depend upon the discretion of any single regional power.

The issue is larger than shipping fees.

It concerns sovereignty.

It concerns maritime law.

It concerns strategic balance.

Iran and Oman have already signalled their intention to discuss future navigation arrangements and associated service charges.

Such proposals immediately raise concerns regarding the emergence of a de facto tolling mechanism under the language of administrative or navigational services.

The Gulf Cooperation Council states, with the exception of Oman, have consistently opposed such arrangements.

They have rejected any attempt to legitimise permanent fees or exclusive control over one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.

While some governments may be prepared to negotiate temporary charges related to mine clearance or emergency navigation support, permanent fees are viewed as unacceptable.

The implications extend far beyond the Gulf itself.

If a precedent emerges whereby major maritime chokepoints become subject to unilateral administration or compulsory charges, other strategic waterways may eventually face similar pressures.

The principles governing international commerce and maritime freedom would be weakened considerably.

Another difficulty lies in the inconsistent messaging emerging from Washington itself.

American officials insist that no tolls will be permitted.

At the same time, different branches of the administration have offered differing interpretations of implementation and enforcement.

For allies and partners seeking certainty, ambiguity can be almost as destabilising as confrontation itself.

Deterrence ultimately depends not merely upon military capability but also upon political credibility.

Uncertainty weakens both.

The result is an agreement that pauses conflict without resolving its underlying causes.

Missiles remain.

Drone capabilities remain.

Proxy networks remain.

Competing interpretations of maritime governance remain.

Mutual distrust remains.

The memorandum therefore resembles an armistice more than a settlement.

History offers many examples of agreements that ended immediate fighting while simultaneously creating the conditions for future crises.

The danger facing the Gulf today is not that the memorandum will collapse immediately.

The greater danger is that it will appear successful long enough for unresolved tensions to harden into new strategic realities.

Peace built upon unresolved contradictions rarely endures.

The memorandum may buy time.

Whether it buys stability is a very different question.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and director, Institute of Internationalisation and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia. 

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.